Trademarks and Generic Words: An Effecton-Competition Test
Two years ago, in Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun
Group, Inc.,1 the Ninth Circuit invalidated Parker Brothers's
trademark, "Monopoly," on the ground that it had become the generic name of a certain type of board game.2 Although the court
applied the usual test for genericness, the so-called "primary significance" test, to reach its decision, that decision provoked consternation among legal commentators 3 and some members of Congress. 4 The widespread dissatisfaction with the Anti-Monopoly
case suggests that the time is ripe for a reevaluation of the use of
the primary significance test in genericness cases.
This comment consists of three sections. The first section
briefly reviews the purpose of trademark law and the current state
of the genericness doctrine. The second section criticizes the primary significance test as being the product of an outmoded conception of the function of trademarks. The final section proposes
1 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983). This was the second appellate decision in the case. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group,
Inc., 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 634 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (granting permanent injunction to plaintiff),
rev'd and remanded, 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun
Group, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (same case on remand, granting permanent
injunction to plaintiff), af'd, 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234
(1983).
2 Under the current federal trademark statute, the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127
(1982), words that are common names or "merely descriptive" of products may not be registered as trademarks. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (1982). Nondescriptive trademarks, while not
disqualified from registration, may similarly be denied protection under the Lanham Act if,
through repeated use, they come to be "common descriptive name[s]" of products. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1064(c) (1982). The term "generic" is used by courts to describe both categories of unprotected words. See, e.g., Henry Heide, Inc. v. George Zeigler Co., 354 F.2d 574, 576 (7th Cir.
1965) (holding "jujubes" the generic name of a tropical fruit flavor); King-Seeley Thermos
Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that the mark "Thermos"
had become generic). This comment focuses exclusively on the second category, i.e. nondescriptive trademarks that may be challenged as having become generic.
3 See Greenbaum, Ginsburg & Weinberg, A Proposalfor Evaluating Genericism After
"Anti-Monopoly," 73 TRAE-MARK REP. 101 (1983); Zeisel, The Surveys That Broke Monopoly, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 896 (1983); Note, Genericide: Cancellation of a Registered
Trademark, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 666 (1983).
" An amendment to the Lanham Act that would repudiate the primary significance test
was proposed in 1983 by Senator Hatch. See S. 1440, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc.
S8137 (daily ed. June 9, 1983).
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that the primary significance test be replaced by a test that balances the effects on competition of protecting or prohibiting the
exclusive use of the trademark.
I. THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS AND THE GENERIcNEss DOCTRINE

A.

Trademark Law and the Competitive Process

The law regulating trade and commerce frequently seeks to
promote competition as a means of allocating resources efficiently
and insuring reasonable prices. The antitrust laws, for example,
prohibit monopolies because they inflate prices and reduce the
overall welfare of society. In some respects, the law of intellectual
property runs counter to this general policy of promoting competition. The patent 6 and copyright 7 laws, for example, grant monopolies of limited duration over their works to inventors and artists in
order to provide incentives for them to create such works.'
Trademark law seems at first glance to be a similar exception
to the policy of promoting competition. It provides a trademark
holder with a monopoly of unlimited duration 9 over the distinctive
mark, symbol, or device that he affixes to his goods to identify
them in the market and to vouch for their origin. 10 Like the limited monopoly granted by patent and copyright laws, the protection of trademarks serves an incentive function: it stimulates
merchants and manufacturers to provide reliable products and reasonable prices by enabling them to reap the benefits of repeat sales
to satisfied customers. 1 ' Unlike the patent and copyright laws,
however, trademark protection is intended to promote, not hinder,
competition. Trademarks foster effective competition by facilitat5 See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, EcoNoMIc NOTES, AND OTHER
4-11 (2d ed. 1981); Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act,
9 J.L. & EcoN. 7, 15-21 (1966).
' See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
7 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-05 (1982).
3 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974); Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
o See Diamond, Properly Used, Trademarks Are Forever, 68 A.B.A. J. 1575, 1576
(1982).
"0See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 87 (1879). The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §9 10511127 (1982), defines a trademark as "any word, name, symbol or device or any combination
thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others." Id. at § 1127.
11 See American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 380 (1926); Eastern Wine
Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758
(1943); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 520 F. Supp. 395, 397 (D. Utah 1981),
rev'd on other grounds, 711 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1983).

MATERIALS

The University of Chicago Law Review

[51:868

ing a consumer's effort to distinguish among the goods of competing producers.1 2 As the sponsors of the Lanham Act, 13 the current
federal trademark statute, noted, "Trade-marks, indeed, are the
very essence of competition, because they make possible a choice
between competing articles ....
Because the policy of the trademark law is to promote competition, a trademark, unlike a patent or copyright, affords no monopoly over the product to which it is affixed;' 5 indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that there is a strong federal policy that
goods unprotected by patents or copyrights should be copyable by
anyone.1 6 Although copying is not socially esteemed, the law encourages it in order to promote competition in the copied article,
and so make goods more widely and cheaply available.
The Genericness Doctrine and the Primary Significance Test

B.

It would clearly thwart the pro-competitive purpose of trademark law to permit a producer to use trademarks to achieve monopolies over the production or sale of uncopyrighted and unpatented products. Allowing Acme, the manufacturer of a product
whose only common name is "widget," to use that name as a trademark would stifle competition in widgets. Competing widget manu12 See Backman, The Role of Trademarks in Our Competitive Economy, 58 TRADE-

REP. 219, 219 (1968); Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65
REP. 265, 289-90 (1975); Leeds, Trademarks-Our American Concept, 46
TRADE-MARK REP. 1451, 1453 (1956).
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982).
14 S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1946); H.R. REP. No. 219, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1945).
15See Independent Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman, 130 F. 726, 728 (C.C.D.N.J. 1904)
(establishment of a trademark "does not restrain in any degree the manufacture or sale by
others of the article or commodity to which the trade-mark is attached").
16 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1964).
17 See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 121-22 (1938); Smith v. Chanel, Inc. 402 F.2d 562, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1968); Societe Comptoir de l'Industrie Cotonniere
Etablissements Boussac v. Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1962);
American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
915 (1959).
Despite the general pro-competitive emphasis of trademark law, see supra text accompanying notes 12-15, it is clear that the interest of trademark owners in their trademarks is
not always subordinated to the ideal of unfettered competition. Trademark law derives historically from the common-law tort of unfair competition, or "passing off," see McClure,
Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 311-14 (1979), and the Lanham Act explicitly retains the common law's
concern for "protect[ing] persons engaged in ... commerce against unfair competition," 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (1982); see S.C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 178 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949); Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 861,
863 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), afl'd, 312 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1963).
MARK
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facturers would be unable to use the one word with which they
could tell consumers what they make. The widget-buying public
would also be harmed because it would either have to incur costs
in identifying other manufacturers who made widgets or have to
pay monopolistic prices to Acme. 8 In order to avert this harm to
consumers and competitors, 19 the Lanham Act codified the common law20 exclusion of words that are common names or are
"merely descriptive" of products from protection as trademarks:
section 1052(e)(1) prohibits such words from being registered as
trademarks. 21 Further, section 1064(c) denies protection to registered, nondescriptive trademarks that come, through repeated use,
to be "common descriptive'' 2 or generic" names of products. In
18 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir. 1976);
CES Publishing Corp. v. St. Regis Publications, Inc., 531 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1975); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 38-43 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J., concurring); cf.
Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566-69 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding that the defendant
would be entitled to use the plaintiff's valid trademark in comparative advertising if the
parties' products were in fact substantially identical).
19 As originally reported by the House Committee on Patents, the Lanham Act iequired
cancellation of a registered trademark on the basis of genericness only where the acts of its
holder had caused it "to lose its significance as an indication of origin." H.R. 1654, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess., 91 CONG. REc. 1470 (1945). The Senate rejected this provision and replaced
it with the language currently contained in § 1064(c) of the current Act. See S. REP. No.
1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1946); H.R. RsP. No. 2322, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1946).
That section provides that any trademark that becomes "the common descriptive name" of
a product is invalid. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1982). The Senate amendment appears to have
been prompted by Justice Department concern that the House bill would permit trademark
owners to achieve monopoly power by giving them "an exclusive right to the only name...
Without the use of these common names it
by which a product is known to the public ....
would be almost impossible for new manufacturers to persuade buyers that they are selling
the same products. . . ." Letter from Assistant Attorney General W. Berge to Sen. C. Pepper (Nov. 14, 1944), reprinted in Trade-marks: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Patents,78th Cong., 2d Sess. 60-61 (1944) [hereinafter cited as Hearings];accord
92 CONG. REc 7872-73 (1946) (statement of Sen. O'Mahoney).
20 See, e.g., Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 323-24 (1871).
21 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (1982). The language "merely descriptive" in § 1052(e)(1) covers two categories of words. The first is common nouns, such as "sand" or "flour," which
ordinarily cannot be used as trademarks since they do not serve to distinguish one manufacturer's goods from another's. See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537
F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); Henry Heide, Inc. v. George Zeigler Co., 354 F.2d 574, 576 (7th Cir.
1965). But see Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co., 254 U.S. 143, 146 (1920) (The word "cola" has
"acquired a secondary meaning in which perhaps the product is more emphasized than the
producer but to which the producer is entitled."). The second category is descriptive terms,
such as "shredded wheat" or "raisin bran," which may only be registered as trademarks if
the applicant can show that they have "become distinctive of [his] goods in commerce," 15
U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1982), or, to use the common law term, that they have acquired a "secondary meaning." See, e.g., Roux Laboratories, Inc. v. Clairol, Inc., 427 F.2d 823 (C.C.P.A.

1970).

15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1982).
The category of nondescriptive marks entitled to registration under the Lanham Act
22
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determining whether a particular registered mark falls within this
latter category, a court is necessarily choosing between two competing uses of the mark: either as indicating the markholder's
brand or as indicating the general product category, or genus, of
which that brand is a particular example and within which that
brand competes. 4
Courts faced with this decision have generally limited their inquiry to a lexicological one: "What does the word mean? ' 25 As

includes arbitrary and fanciful terms, such as "Corvette," which in no way signify the product, and suggestive terms, such as "Firebird," which "require the observer or listener to use
imagination and perception to determine the nature of the goods." Miller Brewing Co. v. G.
Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1977); accord Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
Hunting World, Inc. 537 F.2d 4, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1976).
23 Although the Lanham Act does not use the word "generic," courts have equated the
common law doctrine of genericness with the Lanham's Act proscription of the use of "common descriptive names" as trademarks. See, e.g., Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d
1178, 1183 n.13 (5th Cir. 1980) ("The term 'generic' is synonymous with the phrase 'common
descriptive name,' as used in the Lanham Act.").
" Although each of the parties in a case involving an allegation that a registered trademark has become generic seeks the right to use the mark, the nature of the right that the
markholder seeks is significantly different from that sought by the challenger. If the
markholder prevails and the mark is held not to have become generic, then the markholder's
right to use the mark is exclusive. If, however, the challenger prevails and the mark is held
to have become generic, then the mark can be used freely by anyone who manufactures a
product within the relevant product category found to be denoted by the mark. The successful challenger cannot claim exclusive rights in the mark, since, having been found to be
generic, the mark is entitled to neither registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1982) nor
protection under 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1982). See supra note 21. What is thus at stake for
the challenger in such a genericness case is the right to use a once valid trademark as the
name for products made by persons other than the trademark holder. Recognition of this
right does not, however, absolve those who are entitled to exercise it from the obligation to
make clear that their products are not made by the original trademark holder. See, e.g.,
King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963); Feathercombs,
Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306 F.2d 251, 255-56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 910 (1962).
'5 See, e.g., Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1319
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin
Indus., 321 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir. 1963); Selchow & Righter Co. v. Western Printing &
Lithographing Co., 47 F. Supp. 323, 326 (E.D. Wis. 1942). Despite the primacy of the lexicological approach, however, some courts have also considered other factors that appear to
bear no relation to what the trademark means or how it is used insofar as that is relevant to
the genericness inquiry. For example, the amount of effort a trademark holder has expended
in defending or "policing" his mark does not help answer the question of whether the mark
has, in fact, come to signify an entire product category rather than a particular manufacturer's or retailer's brand. See, e.g., King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d
577, 579 (2d Cir. 1963); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 81 (2d Cir.
1936), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 575 (1938). Courts deciding genericness cases nonetheless have
often considered the trademark holder's diligence in policing his mark as relevant to deciding the genericness issue. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393
F. Supp. 502, 523-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); American Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 207
F. Supp. 9, 13 (D. Conn. 1962), aff'd on other groundssub nom. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v.
Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963).
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Judge Learned Hand stated in Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co. (The
Aspirin Case), 26 "The single question, as I view it, in all these
cases, is merely one of fact: What do buyers understand by the
2' 7
word for whose use the parties are contending?
The primary significance test, the most prominent lexicological approach to genericness, derives from the Supreme Court's
opinion in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. (The Shredded
Wheat Case).2 8 The issue in that case was whether the name
"shredded wheat" had acquired a secondary meaning of breakfast
cereal made at Niagara Falls by plaintiff's corporate predecessor.
The Court held that "to establish a trade name in the term 'shredded wheat' the plaintiff must show more than a subordinate meaning which applies to it. It must show that the primary significance
of the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the product- but the producer. ' 29 This "primary significance" test, which
was formulated to determine whether an originally descriptive
term had acquired secondary meaning, has since been used as the
standard test for genericness in cases involving originally valid
nondescriptive trademarks as well.3 0

A recent law review note, arguing that the primary purpose of trademark law is to protect investments in trademarks, defends judicial consideration of a trademark-holder's diligence in policing his mark in genericness cases, see Note, supra note 3, at 686-90, and several Supreme Court cases appear to attribute weight to the "property rights" of the
trademark holder and to his investment in the mark. See, e.g., Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327
U.S. 608, 612 (1946); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 261-62
(1916). Yet a trademark holder's property right is nothing more than his "right to the continued enjoyment of his trade reputation and the good-will that flows from it," Hanover
Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916), and a trademark that has become
generic, and so lost its ability to identify the holder or his brand, cannot incorporate its
holder's goodwill. (For further development of the concept of "brand" and how it may incorporate the good-will of the trademark holder, see infra text accompanying notes 41-50).
Though a trademark's genericness may be affected by the trademark-holder's investment in
policing the mark, the amount of time and money invested on a mark is in and of itself
irrelevant to determining the mark's genericness.
26 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
27 Id. at 509.
8 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
2 Id. at 118.
30 See, e.g., Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 132126 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 523-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). Although the primary significance test is the most frequently used lexicological test for genericness, others have been
applied. See, e.g., Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306 F.2d 251, 256 (2d Cir.) (requiring the party attacking the mark as generic to show that its principal significance is its
indication of the "nature" of the article), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 910 (1962); Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 129 F. Supp. 243, 270 (D. Mass. 1955) (test for genericness is whether the mark
has lost all of its trademark significance to the consuming public), afl'd, 237 F.2d 428 (1st
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1005 (1957).
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DEFECTS OF THE PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE TEST

The primary significance test has two crucial interrelated defects: it rests upon an antiquated conception of the function of
trademarks, and it therefore focuses on the wrong question in determining a mark's primary significance.
A.

Antiquated Conception of the Function of Trademarks

The primary significance test assumes a neat dichotomy between product and producer. The test requires the court to decide
whether a mark designates primarily a product or its producer-for example, whether "thermos" denotes vacuum bottles in
general or a particular manufacturer of vacuum bottles. The test
assumes that the products of various competing manufacturers are
readily interchangeable, or, in other words, that the consumer
makes two separate purchasing decisions, one about the product he
wishes to buy, the other about the source from which he wishes to
buy it. The only function of trademarks, under this analysis, is to
guide the second decision. As the Ninth Circuit stated in AntiMonopoly, "it is the source-denoting function which trademarks
protect, and nothing more."3' Thus, under the primary significance
test, "when a trademark primarily denotes a product, not the prod3' 2
uct's producer, the trademark is lost.
The earliest trademarks did indeed do nothing more than designate the source of the goods to which they were attached.3 3 They
enabled the consumer to identify the manufacturer or merchant of
a product but told him nothing else, except that goods bearing the
same mark were likely to be of the same quality. 4 Even today,
some trademarks continue to serve only a source-denoting function. A trademark on a fungible commodity, such as sugar or salt,
usually does no more than tell the consumer which firm placed the
product on the market. With the advent of mass marketing, national distribution of products, and widespread advertising, however, most trademarks today have a much broader function.3
Most products on the market today are not perceived by con31

Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v: General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 611 F.2d 296, 301 (9th Cir.

1979) (citation omitted).
32 Id.
See Diamond, supra note 12, passim.
See id. at 289-90.
"See Greenbaum, Ginsburg & Weinberg, supra note 3, at 102; Swann, The Validity of
Dual Functioning Trademarks: Genericism Tested by Consumer Understanding Rather
than by Consumer Uses, 69 TRADE-MARK REP. 357, passim (1979).
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sumers as merely fungible commodities. A smoker, for example,
does not decide to purchase cigarettes and then decide to purchase
them from a particular tobacco company. The modern consumer is
likely to regard each brand of cigarettes as a unique product, although each is ultimately substitutable for the others, and he is
likely to be indifferent about the sources of any given brand. A
Camel smoker who is unable to buy Camels would probably not be
persuaded to buy Now 100's by being told that both are made by
the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. Similarly, a consumer who
sets out to buy Ivory soap would hardly be persuaded to accept
Lava or even Camay in its place although all three are manufactured by Procter & Gamble. Even when consumers are motivated
to purchase a particular brand because they have a high opinion of
its manufacturer, they may still consider their preferred brand to
be a unique product among those made by that manufacturer; such
"brand loyalty" is a recognized factor in devising advertising campaigns. 3 A driver who prefers General Motors automobiles because
he believes they last longer than those of other manufacturers may
nevertheless strongly prefer a Chevrolet Citation to a Buick Skylark, even though both cars are built by General Motors and both
are in virtually all respects the same car.3 7 Thus, "[v]iewing products simply as physical objects is too restrictive. Consumers have
beliefs about products that are not solely a function of their physical characteristics . . . . [T]he image fostered by the price, the
product design, and the manner in which the product is distributed become part of the product." 8
Because most consumer goods are in this sense more than
mere fungible commodities, a trademark today does not evoke in
the minds of consumers separate and independent concepts of,
product and source, but rather evokes a "brand image.""9 A brand
image is a complex constellation of associations and images that
comprises a consumer's knowledge of the brand and his attitudes
towards it. It may include knowledge of the source of the product,
awareness of other product characteristics, beliefs about the value
of the object, and judgments about the suitability of the brand.40

' See, e.g., D.

AAKER & J. MYERS, ADVERTISING MANAGEMENT 49 (1975).
See In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979).
33 B. STERNTHAL & C. CRAIG, CONSuMER BEHAVIOR: AN INFORMATION PROCESSING PERSPEcTIE 238 (1982).
3' See Gardner & Levy, The Product and the Brand, HARv. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1955,
37

at 33.
40

See Howard & Ostlund, The Model: Current Status of Buyer Behavior Theory, in
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The primary significance test, in requiring that a mark must primarily signify the source of a product in order to be a valid trademark, simply ignores the complex nature of brand images.
Some courts 41 and commentators 42 have realized that trademarks frequently perform a dual or hybrid function of simultaneously denoting both product and source. This observation, however, does not take full account of the way that modern
trademarks function, for the trademark that conveys the complex
cluster of ideas that constitutes a brand image is more than a mere
hybrid of product- and source-denoting attributes. Indeed, the particular source of a product may not be a part of a brand image at
all. For example, few Marlboro cigarette smokers are likely to
know or care that Philip Morris, Inc. manufactures Marlboros; yet
this fact does not suggest that the "Marlboro" trademark or any
other mark denoting brand but not source should be invalidated.
To the extent that the "Marlboro" trademark tells a smoker that
the Marlboro cigarettes he buys today are the same as the Marlboro cigarettes he bought yesterday, the trademark performs the
classic quality-assurance function of a source-denoting mark,43 regardless of whether it does in fact denote source. Protecting branddenoting trademarks is perfectly consistent with the Lanham Act,
one of the chief purposes of which is to prevent consumer confusion by making it possible for consumers to rely on trademarks as
44
an assurance of consistent quality.
Neither does protection of brand-denoting trademarks implicate the anti-monopolistic concerns at the heart of the genericness
doctrine. 45 Although consumers tend to regard brand-name products as in some sense unique,46 the perceived uniqueness of the
products derives largely from the marketing efforts of their manu-

BUYER BEHAVIOR 3 (J. HOWARD & S. OsTLuND eds. 1973); S. LEVY, MARKETPLACE BEHAVIOR

167-68 (1978); see also Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117, 122
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 966 (1968) ("[T]he theory behind ... modem advertising
is that once the name or trade-mark is firmly associated in the mind of the buying public
with some desired characteristic-quality, social status, etc.-the public will buy that
product.").
41 See, e.g., In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1054 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J., concurring); Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 108 F. Supp. 845, 863 (D.N.J. 1952), af'd, 206
F.2d 144 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 867 (1953).
42 See Folsom & Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323, 1339-40, 1350
(1980); Swann, supra note 35, passim.
43 See Diamond, supra note 12, at 289-90.
44 See Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1228 (3d Cir. 1978);
S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
4' See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
4' See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
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facturers. Marlboro cigarettes may be perceived by consumers as
uniquely embodying a certain virility, but this perception undoubtedly results almost entirely from Philip Morris's advertising and
not from any physical quality of the cigarettes themselves. To that
extent, the "uniqueness" conveyed by the "Marlboro" trademark is
nothing more than the goodwill of the trademark holder, albeit the
goodwill associated by the public with the brand name rather than
the trademark holder's name. Goodwill is an interest that has long
been established as within the realm of interests legitimately protected by trademark law.4 7 Protecting such brand-denoting trademarks does not impede competition in the same way as would permitting one sugar producer to monopolize use of the word "sugar"
to identify its products. Although Marlboro cigarettes may be perceived by consumers as more than merely one of a number of identical, interchangeable cigarettes, they are cigarettes, and Philip
Morris's competitors have access to the word "cigarette" to describe their products. Further, a competitor who produced cigarettes identical to Marlboros would be entitled to use the Marlboro
trademark in order to inform consumers of that fact.4 1 He would
not need to name his cigarettes "Marlboro" in order to compete
with Philip Morris.
Rigid adherence to the primary significance test would frequently invalidate such brand-name trademarks, and many of the
best-known trademarks would be unprotectable on the ground that
they are not primarily source-denoting. 4 In the Anti-Monopoly
case, General Mills introduced a survey intended as a reductio ad
absurdum. The survey showed that sixty-eight percent of the respondents reported that they would buy Tide because they liked
Tide, not because they liked Procter & Gamble productsY' The
Ninth Circuit commented, correctly, that the survey tended to
show that the public thinks of Tide as a particular kind of detergent rather than as a name used by Procter & Gamble for a product, detergent, that is made by a number of manufacturers. If so,
47 See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916); supra note 25.

11 See, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968) (use of plaintiff's "Chanel No. 5" trademark permissible in comparative advertising by defendant if defendant's
product is identical to plaintiff's); Societe Comptoir de l'Industrie Contonniere Etablissements Boussac v. Alexander's Dep't. Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1962) (permitting
use of plaintiff's trademark "Dior" to identify defendant's dresses as copies of plaintiff's).
49 See Note, supra note 3, at 671.
10 See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1326 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983); Petition for Certiorari at 1, C.P.G. Prods. v.
Anti-Monopoly, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1243 (1983), reprinted in 25 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT
J. (BNA) 189, 189 (1983).
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the court noted, Procter & Gamble may, under the primary signifi'51
cance test, have "cause for alarm.
Invalidation of popular trademarks for genericness on the
ground that they indicate something more than or different from
the source is not mandated by the Lanham Act. By the 1940's,
when the Lanham Act was enacted, the practice of using trademarks to designate particular products, not merely or primarily
their sources, was widespread.5 2 The Supreme Court, in a case
cited by the House Committee on Patents in its report on the bill
that became the Lanham Act, recognized that "the protection of
trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological function
of symbols" that convey the desirability of the commodities upon
which they appear.5
Against this background, the House Committee on Patents reported that the Lanham Act was designed to "modernize the
trade-mark statutes so that they will conform to legitimate present-day business practice."" The Committee viewed the function
of trademarks as enabling the public to distinguish between "competing articles" and intended the Act to protect the goodwill of the
trademark holder who spends "energy, time, and money in
presenting to the public the product. 5 5 This legislative history indicates that Congress was aware of the then widespread practice of
using trademarks primarily to convey brand or product image
rather than simply source. It also indicates that Congress intended
to protect such marks.5 6 The application of the primary significance test to invalidate trademarks that are used primarily to con"1Anti-Monopoly,

Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1326 (9th Cir.

1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983).
" Marks such as "Vaseline," "Kodak," and "Congoleum" were then in use. See Hearings, supra note 19, at 103-04.
53 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942),
quoted in H.R. RP. No. 219, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945).
" H.R. REP'. No. 219, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1945); see 92 CONG. REc. 7524 (1946)
(statement of Rep. Lanham).
55 H.R. REP. No. 219, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1945) (emphasis added).
"During floor debate on the Lanham Act, one senator remarked that the Act incorporated the common-law doctrine that trademarks exist "to give notice to the public that the
commodity to which it is attached is produced by a particular producer." 92 CONG. REc.
7827 (1946) (statement of Sen. O'Mahoney). However, in light of the many expressions in
the legislative history of an intent to make the trademark law reflect then-current business
practice, it is clear that Congress was prepared to depart from some aspects of the common
law of trademark in order to save marks like "Vaseline," "Kodak," and "Congoleum." See
supra note 52. Indeed, Representative Lanham, sponsor of the Act, explicitly stated that the
bill would create "new rights, some of which are substantive and others procedural." 92
CONG. REC. 7524 (1946).
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vey information other than source imposes a model of the use of
trademarks that was outmoded even when the Lanham Act was
passed. This result is contrary to the express intention of Congress
to update the trademark statute to conform to then-current busi57
ness practices.
B.

Improper Focus

Because the ultimate purpose of trademark law in general and
the genericness doctrine in particular is to promote competition,
the goal of the test for genericness must be to determine whether
competition is best served by using the mark to designate a particular brand or by using the mark to designate the genus in which
that brand competes. If products were merely fungible commodities, for which "product" and "source" were neatly severable concepts, a determination that a trademark primarily signified "product" might well be an adequate proxy for determining whether
exclusive use of the mark by one manufacturer or distributor
would tend to foster monopoly in the relevant market. Yet trademarks in the modern commercial world predominantly designate
brands perceived by the consumer as unique by virtue of the goodwill incorporated in the brand name."8 The primary significance
test's emphasis on "product" and "source" therefore tends to obscure the basic issue in genericness cases: the effect on competition
of allowing continued use of an allegedly generic word as a
trademark.
Applying the primary significance test in the Anti-Monopoly
case,5 9 the Ninth Circuit defined the word "Monopoly" by relying
on a survey in which people who had either bought a Monopoly
game recently or who intended to buy one in the near future were
asked to choose between two alternative explanations of their
purchasing decision. Sixty-five percent chose: "I want a 'Monopoly'
game primarily because I am interested in playing 'Monopoly.' I
don't much care who makes it." Thirty-two percent chose: "I
would like Parker Brothers' 'Monopoly' game primarily because I
like Parker Brothers' products." 60 The court held that these results
See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
See supra text accompanying notes 45-48.
59 Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1323 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983).
'0 Id. at 1324. The district court had rejected the results of this survey on the ground
that they constituted an explanation of the consumers' motives rather than evidence of the
primary significance of the word "Monopoly." See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun
Group, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 448, 453 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982),
"
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showed that the primary significance of the word "Monopoly" was
product rather than source."6 " This result is questionable even
under the primary significance test, given that more than half of
the respondents knew that Monopoly is made by Parker Brothers,6 2 and presumably at least some of them were aware that
Parker Brothers was the only producer of the game. Even more
questionable, however, is the court's approach: the court considered its inquiry at an end once it had established a definition of
the word "Monopoly."
Rather than ending with the narrow lexicological inquiry mandated by the primary significance test, a court faced with a gener-

cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983). Senator Hatch's proposed amendment to the Lanham
Act would provide that "[p]urchaser motivation shall not be used to determine whether a
mark is generic." 129 CONG. REc. S8137 (daily ed. June 9, 1983); see also Greenbaum, Ginsburg & Weinberg, supra note 3, at 110 ("The most egregious error of the Anti-Monopoly
appellate decision is its adoption of a 'motivation' test to determine ...
primary
significance.").
The consumer-survey approach for determining primary significance has gained ascendancy over an earlier tendency to rely on evidence of use in advertisements, articles in newspapers, magazines, and trade journals, as well as on dictionary definitions. See Folsom &
Teply, supra note 42, at 1353 (noting reliance of some courts on "media clips" and "dictionary citations" and discussing the inadequacies of lexicological evidence in genericness cases).
Compare Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1323-26 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983) (relying on consumer surveys), and American
Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 207 F. Supp. 9, 21-22 (D. Conn. 1962), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963)
(same), with Nissen Trampoline Co. v. American Trampoline Co., 193 F. Supp. 745, 749
(S.D. Iowa 1961) (relying on lexicological evidence). Courts have been unable, however, to
develop a uniform standard for the types of survey evidence that will establish primary
significance. Compare Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316,
1323-24 (9th Cir. 1982) (relying on a survey that asked consumers whether they bought
Monopoly games because they wanted to play Monopoly or because they liked Parker
Brothers' products), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983), with E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 526-27 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (relying on a survey in
which consumers were told that a brand name is an indicator of a product made by one
company, and then asked whether "Teflon" was a brand name or a product name), and
American Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 207 F. Supp. 9, 20-22 (D. Conn. 1962), a/f'd
on other grounds sub nom. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577 (2d
Cir. 1963) (relying on a survey in which consumers were asked what they would call a
container that kept its contents hot or cold). See generally Zeisel, supra note 3, at 900-07
(criticizing the "Thermos," "Teflon," and "consumer motivation" surveys). While all of the
survey questions that have been used in genericness cases do, to some extent, aid in determining the primary significance of a mark, there is no reason to believe that they would lead
to the same result in any given case. See Greenbaum, Ginsburg & Weinberg, supra note 3,
at 120. More importantly, there is no reason to think that the answer to any of these questions would necessarily answer the question whether upholding the contested trademark
would adversely affect competition in the relevant product market.
81 Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1325-26 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983).
62 Id. at 1322-23.
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icness case should seek to balance the conflicting interests of the
trademark holder, the alleged infringer, and the public in the manner that most tends to foster competition in the relevant product
market.6 s The trademark holder's interest lies in preventing diversion of customers who, should the trademark be invalidated and
thus become available for use by his competitors, might be unable
to distinguish the trademark holder's products from those produced by his competitors.6 The party challenging the mark has an
interest in communicating the nature of his product to consumers
in order to compete effectively with the trademark holder.6 5 The
public has two corresponding interests. The availability of a name
to denote a given type of product serves the public interest by facilitating competition among producers of such products, thus
leading to increased access to goods and to lower prices.6 On the
other hand, the public may also have an interest in the trademark
holder's continued use of the mark as a trademark, since by referring to that mark the consumer can have some assurance that the
goods bearing it will be of consistent quality.6 7 The proper task for
courts in genericness cases is to determine where the public interest lies.6 8
A genericness test that focuses exclusively on whether a word
signifies primarily a product or a particular source of that product
cannot provide adequate opportunities for such a balancing of interests. If the challenging party can show that the trademark's
meaning does not primarily designate its source, he will be able to
have the holder's right to exclusive use of the mark invalidated
without making any showing that such exclusive use restrains competition. 9 As the Ninth Circuit's treatment of the Tide hypotheti6SSee American Chicle Co. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 208 F.2d 560, 562 (2d Cir.

1953).
See id; supra note 17.
e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.

65 See,

1976).
46 See, e.g., Societe Comptoir de l'Industrie Cotonniere Etablissements Boussac v. Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1962).
67See Diamond, supra note 12, at 289-90; Hanak, The Quality Assurance Function of
Trademarks, 65 TRADE-MARK REP. 318 (1975).
66 Courts have engaged in this type of interest balancing in some trademark cases
outside the genericness context. See, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 565-69 (9th
Cir. 1968) (action to enjoin use of the name "Chanel No. 5" in comparative advertising for a
substantially identical product); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 38-43 (2d
Cir. 1945) (Frank, J., concurring) (action alleging infringement of trademark "V-8 Juice" by
use of the mark "V-8" on vitamins).
69 See Folsom & Teply, supra note 42, at 1353.
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cal in the Anti-Monopoly case 70 indicates, a brand-denoting trademark might be invalidated under the primary significance test
merely because it denotes something other than the source, even
though its use as a trademark may have little or no adverse impact
on competition in the relevant market.
III.

AN EFFECT-ON-COMPETITION TEST

In view of the defects of the primary significance test, courts
should abandon it. In its place they should adopt a test that directly assesses the effect on competition of allowing continued use
of a particular term as a trademark. This comment proposes such a
test.7 1
A.

Determining the Relevant Genus

The preceding section of this comment has demonstrated two
salient flaws in the primary significance test: its failure to reflect
the modern brand-denoting function of trademarks, and its inadequacy, in light of that failure, as a means for determining the effect
of invalidating the trademark on competition in the relevant product market. The second flaw stems from the first. The primary significance test assumes that trademarks legitimately serve only to
distinguish among the sources of fungible commodities, and implicitly denies that they can legitimately be used to distinguish
among various brands, each perceived by consumers as unique
though all substitutable, that together constitute the range of
choices available to a consumer in a particular market. In those
70 See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1326 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983); supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
71

The effect-on-competition test proposed by this comment differs from the "effect on

marketplace efficiency" test proposed in Folsom & Teply, supra note 42, at 1359, in three

respects. First, and most important, while Folsom and Teply recognize that the concepts of
product and source are not perfectly severable since a given mark may convey both simultaneously, see id. at 1339-40, their concept of the "hybrid" mark fails to recognize that the

modem brand-denoting mark may convey neither product nor source in the conventional
sense, see supra text accompanying notes 41-43. Thus, although Folsom and Teply recognize that the proper inquiry is "the impact of trademarked generic words in the market,"
Folsom & Teply, supra note 42, at 1339, they fail to comprehend the modem function of

trademarks in the market. Second, Folsom's and Teply's proposed test begins with a determination of the "relevant consuming universe," id. at 1347-50, rather than with the more
direct determination of the relevant genus proposed by this comment. See infra text accompanying notes 80-85. Third, because Folsom and Teply advocate enforcement of the Lanham Act by the Federal Trade Commission, see Folsom & Teply, supra note 42, at 1355-58,
they do not tailor their test procedurally to private lawsuits. See infra text accompanying
notes 86-96.
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markets that conform to the model that underlies the primary significance test, the product market is necessarily well defined, and
the inquiry into effect on competition is reduced to an inquiry
whether competition would be better promoted by making the
trademark available to all producers as the generic name of a fungible product. In such a market, the primary significance test
serves to answer this inquiry rather well."' Where, as is the case
with most products sold in modern consumer markets, the products are sold under trademarked brand names and are perceived as
unique by consumers at least in part by virtue of the goodwill incorporated into the brand name, the primary significance test
proves inadequate, for it fails to require that a court faced with a
genericness challenge first determine the relevant genus or product
market in which the product is sold and in which the effect on
competition of upholding or invalidating the challenged trademark
is to be gauged. By assuming that a particular brand, because it is
not perceived by consumers as fungible with other brands, is itself
the "product," the primary significance test stacks the lexicological
deck in favor of finding that the mark has taken on generic
significance.
In the Anti-Monopoly case, for example, General Mills, the
corporate parent of Parker Brothers, contended that the relevant
genus was "real estate trading board games," not the Monopoly
game with all its distinguishing characteristics. 7 3 Although the district court in its first opinion accepted this contention,"4 the Ninth
Circuit began its analysis by assuming that the relevant genus was
Monopoly games.71 The existence of this assumption is revealed by
the court's reliance on a survey that recapitulated in some detail

72
73

See supra text preceding note 58.
See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 634,

638 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd and remanded, 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979).
74 See id. at 638.
71 Although the court acknowledged in a footnote that genus or product category might
be defined in terms of cross-elasticity of demand, see Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills
Fun Group, Inc., 611 F.2d 296, 303 n.4 (9th Cir. 1979), see infra text accompanying notes
80-82, it made no attempt to perform such an analysis. Yet it is unlikely that acceptance of
General Mills's cross-elasticity argument would have changed the Ninth Circuit's disposition of the case, given the court's acceptance of a strict dichotomy between producer and
product. Based on this assumption the court drew a distinction between those product characteristics that it deemed source-denoting, such as price and quality, and those that it
deemed product-denoting, such as style. If the Ninth Circuit had perceived that Monopoly's
unique qualities were primarily product-&enoting, it would have held that Monopoly is a
separate genus within the larger category of real estate trading games. See id. at 303. For
criticism of this aspect of the primary significance test, see Folsom & Teply, supra note 42,
at 1359; Swann, supra note 35, passim; supra text accompanying notes 31-42.
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the rules of Monopoly, and then asked consumers what they would
call such a game. 8 Once the court chose to regard Monopoly as a
genus unto itself, the question posed by the primary significance
test-whether the name "Monopoly" was understood to denominate the Monopoly genus-virtually answered itself. The court was
therefore able to decide the case without directly confronting what
ought to have been the central issue: whether continued use of
"Monopoly" as a trademark would best serve the goal of promoting
competition in the relevant market.
The first step in a genericness inquiry, therefore, must be to
determine the relevant genus. The court cannot properly determine whether a challenged mark has in fact become "the common
descriptive name of an article or substance"7 7 without first identifying the article or substance with which it is dealing. In some
cases, the answer to this question will be so clear that the parties
will be willing to stipulate to it. There can have been little doubt,
for example, as to what the relevant genus was in the litigation
over the mark "Trampoline. 7 8 Other cases, however, will present
closer questions. In Anti-Monopoly, for example, the court assumed that Monopoly itself constitutes a genus.7 9 Given the game's
unique characteristics (it is impossible to argue that another board
game is substitutable for Monopoly in quite the same way that one
color television is for another), this conclusion may well have been
correct. It is not, however, intuitively obvious in what genus Monopoly should be classed.
A court might turn for assistance in determining the relevant
genus to the concept of cross-elasticity of demand frequently used
in antitrust litigation. Under this concept, if a decline in the price
of product A will lead to a decline in the demand for product B,
demand for A and B is said to be cross-elastic, and products A and
B would be held to be competing in the same market."1 In the
78 The survey asked consumers what they would call "business board games of the kind
in which players buy, sell, mortgage and trade city streets, utilities and railroads, build
houses, collect rents and win by bankrupting all other players." Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1323 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234
(1983); see Zeisel, supra note 3, at 900-01.
77 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1982).
78 See Nissen Trampoline Co. v. American Trampoline Co., 193 F. Supp. 745, 749 (S.D.
Iowa 1961).
7' Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 611 F.2d 296, 305-06 (9th Cir.
1979).
6o See, e.g., United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394-95
(1956).
81 See id.; 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 521 (1978); Note, The Market:
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Anti-Monopoly case, for example, the contention that Monopoly
belongs to a genus including other board games would be supported by evidence that the demand for Monopoly declines as the
prices of other games decline. Conversely, evidence that the demand for Monopoly is unaffected by fluctuations in the prices of
other games would support the finding that Monopoly is in a genus
by itself.82 Of course, the concept of cross-elasticity of demand
should not be imported unmodified from the antitrust arena to
genericness cases. Some goods have demands that are sufficiently
cross-elastic to limit their producer's ability to charge monopolistic
prices without being in the same genus for purposes of a genericness inquiry. The fact that demand for Sanka is cross-elastic with
demand for regular coffee, tea, instant hot chocolate, and perhaps
even Perrier water, and hence that General Foods had less market
power in the decaffeinated-coffee market than its market share
might otherwise indicate, would little comfort a rival producer of
decaffeinated coffee were "Sanka" the only generally understood
word for his product. The question of which goods consumers regard as being within the same genus is inherently linguistic and
psychological, and hence cannot be determined without at least
some recourse, if only by judicial notice in clear cases, to consumer
opinion and verbal behavior. Nonetheless, because goods with
highly cross-elastic demands are likely to be members of the same
genus, investigating cross-elasticity will frequently be a useful first
step.
B. Determining the Character of the Mark
Once the court has determined what the relevant genus is, it
must then turn its attention to the words available to designate the
products in that genus. Because a registered trademark is entitled
to a presumption of validity under the Lanham Act,"' the party
attacking a mark as generic has the burden of proof.84 Under the

A Concept in Anti-Trust, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 580, 585-94 (1954). For applications of the
concept to trademark law, see Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 611
F.2d 296, 303 n.4 (9th Cir. 1979); 1 J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPBrrrION
§ 12:7 (1973).
12 Zeisel suggests that a trademark should never be cancelled unless there is a genus
with at least two members. See Zeisel, supra note 3, at 908-09. Such a rule, however, would
have serious anti-competitive effects, since appropriation of the only name for a product
would pose a virtually insuperable barrier to new entrants to the relevant market.
15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1982).
See, e.g., Vision Center v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 119 (5th Cir. 1979); Flexitized,
Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913
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test proposed by this comment, the party challenging the mark
must first come forward with survey evidence that the mark is
commonly understood by consumers to be a generic or descriptive
name of the previously identified genus. An appropriate survey
question would be that asked in the Thermos case:8 5 What do you
call this product? The court's task would be complicated if many
survey respondents were to give multiple responses. The court
would then have to consider both absolute frequency of use and
the order in which the terms came to mind. In most cases, however, it would not be difficult to establish whether a term is frequently understood as a common descriptive name of a genus of
products. The few borderline cases would rarely present difficulties
because if it were unclear whether a particular term has come to be
understood as a common descriptive name, it would be highly
likely that there is an alternative descriptive name, and hence that
the exclusive use of the trademark to denote a particular brand
would not impair competition in the relevant market.
A showing that a word is commonly used by consumers to designate a genus of products is clearly relevant to the determination
of the effect on competition of the use of the word as a trademark.
Exclusive appropriation by one producer of a name of a genus
presents a risk that that producer could monopolize the market for
products in that genus to the detriment of his competitors and the
consuming public. 6 A showing that a trademark is commonly understood by consumers as the name of a genus should not, however, be dispositive, as it is under the primary significance test,
since such a showing does not necessarily indicate whether competitors and the public need access to the term as a generic designation.8 7 If there are alternative terms available to designate the
product, the need for the trademark as a generic term may be so
slight as to be outweighed by the trademark holder's interest in
avoiding diversion of his customers."' In addition, a substantial
number of consumers may attach source-denoting as well as product-denoting significance to the trademark,8 9 or may understand
(1965).
85 See American Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 207 F. Supp. 9, 22-23 (D. Conn.
1962), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321
F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963).
$8 See supra text accompanying notes 18-23.
87 For this reason, the "public understanding" test proposed by Greenbaum, Ginsburg
& Weinberg, supra note 3, at 113-114, is inadequate.
" See supra text accompanying note 64.
s9 This was the case in Anti-Monopoly. See 684 F.2d 1316, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
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the mark as the name of a unique brand 0 and may therefore rely
on it as an assurance of consistent quality.9 1 If any of these conditions obtains, permitting competitors of the trademark holder to
use the mark on their goods presents the risk that consumers who
wish to buy the trademark holder's brand will confuse it with competing brands. Thus, where consumers understand the word in
question either as a source designator or a brand designator, they,
like the trademark holder, have an interest in continued protection
of the trademark in order to avoid the likelihood of confusion
among competing goods.9
Accordingly, a showing that a trademark is commonly understood as the name of a genus should establish only a rebuttable
presumption of genericness. The trademark holder may rebut this
presumption by showing: (a) that there are other words that the
public recognizes as names of the genus and that these can be used
in offering and requesting it;9e and (b) that significant numbers of
consumers understand the trademark to denote either a unique
brand or source. Such a showing establishes that the need for the
mark to denote the genus is not compelling, and that the mark in
fact functions to designate the producer's own brand as well.
C. Weighing the Effect on Competition
If the trademark holder makes the required showing, the court
must then decide whether the pro-competitive policy of the trademark statute is better served by continued protection of the trademark or by free availability of the term for use as a product genus.
This assessment involves weighing the needs of competitors 4 to
denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983).
"0See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.
91 See Diamond, supra note 12, at 289-90; Hanak, supra note 67, passim.
" Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1228 (3d Cir. 1978). If,
however, few or no consumers associate a trademark with a particular source, little confusion would result from permitting competitors to use it. See Greenbaum, Ginsburg & Weinberg, supra note 3, at 103.
" The availability of a viable alternative term is largely a function of money. If a competitor is prepared to spend large enough sums of money on educating the public, it can
almost always make an alternative term available. Current law imposes on the party who
first creates a product and a name for it the cost of creating and teaching the public to
recognize a second name if he wishes to use the first as a trademark. See 1 J. McCARTHY,
supra note 81, § 12:9.
" Because a trademark is an exclusive right against all who compete in the same market with the trademark holder, the determination of genericness should not depend alone on
the need of the party challenging the mark. Even if, as in Anti-Monopoly, the challenging
party is not making the product and has no plans to do so, the mark should be invalidated if
there are no alternative names since continued protection of it would deter new entrants
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use the mark to designate their goods against the likelihood of consumer confusion that might result if this use is permitted.9 5 No
simple formula will serve to perform this balancing in every case,
but the general principles are clear and straightforward. The
higher the proportion of consumers who use the challenged mark
as the only name they know for a given product, the greater will be
the need of competitors and the public to use the mark as a generic term. 96 The higher the proportion of consumers who are
aware that the products bearing the challenged mark are made by
a single company, whether or not they can identify that company,
the greater will be the likelihood of confusion if competitors are
permitted to use it to designate their products.
The test proposed here requires the court to engage in a balancing of interests, and may, therefore, seem more difficult to apply than a simple per se rule. Yet, while the primary significance
97
test is stated as a per se rule, it is anything but simple to apply.
It requires the court to balance source designation against product
designation, when in fact consumers do not make that distinction.98 The effect-on-competition test proposed by this comment
also requires an exercise of judgment by the court, but its inquiry
into competing uses of a trademark more directly reflects the interests served by trademarks.
The investigation of consumers' verbal behavior required by
the test proposed here bears a close resemblance to that conducted
by many courts under the primary significance test. In many
genericness cases, courts have inquired into the availability of alternative terms in assessing the need of the public and the trademark holders' competitors for access to the challenged trademarks.99 In Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co. (The Aspirin Case),100
into the relevant product market. See Greenbaum, Ginsburg & Weinberg, supra note 3, at
113 n.34.
95 A recent law review note defending the primary significance test suggests that courts
should assess genericness on the basis of a balance of a "cohesive group of factors," including: "1) availability of alternative terms; 2) likelihood of confusion; 3) public opinion
surveys; 4) secondary meaning; 5) advertising and sales; and 6) manner and length of use."
Note, supra note 3, at 674-90. The note offers no guidance as to how these disparate factors
are to be molded by courts into a "cohesive" test.
"See Greenbaum, Ginsburg & Weinberg, supra note 3, at 106. Conversely, the higher
the proportion of consumers who know some other name for the genus, the less need competitors will have to use the challenged mark. See Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp.,
199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 437, 447 (D. Or. 1978).
9See
supra note 60.
"See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
"See, e.g., Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655, 663 (7th Cir.
1965) (considering alternatives for the name "yo-yo"); Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith, Kline
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for example, the court upheld Bayer's exclusive use of the word
"aspirin" at the wholesale level but denied it at the retail level.
Among the reasons given by Judge Learned Hand for this holding
was that the alternative descriptive name "acetyl salicylic acid"
was recognizable by wholesale purchasers but useless at the retail
level.10 1 Finally, other courts in trademark cases outside the genericness context have engaged in explicit balancing of the interests of
02
trademark holders, competitors, and consumers.'
D.

An Illustration

To illustrate the effect-on-competition test, suppose that
Toshiba were to challenge the validity of the trademark "Xerox"
as applied to copying machines. Under the effect-on-competition
test, Toshiba would first have to show that people often call copying machines "xerox" machines. It could do this by conducting a
survey in which people are either shown a picture of a copying machine or are given a description of its function, and asked what
they call such a machine. If a significant number of the respondents gave the name "xerox" as their only response, Toshiba would
have established a rebuttable presumption that the mark had become generic.
If Toshiba establishes a rebuttable presumption of genericness, Xerox would then have to show that there are viable alternative names for copying machines. Xerox could introduce survey evidence demonstrating that terms such as "photocopier" or
"electrostatic copier" are widely known and understood by the
consuming public as denoting the type or product of which Xerox's
product is but one example. Such evidence might be obtained from
a survey in which consumers are asked to define a series of terms,
including "photocopier" and "electrostatic copier."
Xerox would also be required to introduce evidence showing

& French Laboratories, 207 F.2d 190, 195 (9th Cir. 1953) (considering alternative names for
Dexedrine); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (considering alternatives for "aspirin"). In Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896), the Court
stated that at the expiration of a patent,
along with the public ownership of the device there must also necessarily pass to the
public the generic designation of the thing. . . . To say otherwise would be to hold
that.., the owner of the patent... had retained the designated name which was
essentially necessary to vest the public with the full enjoyment of that which had become theirs by the disappearance of the monopoly.
1- 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
20, Id. at 510.
21 See supra note 68.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[51:868

that a certain percentage of consumers associated the word
"xerox" with the notion that the product bearing that name was
manufactured or distributed by a single entity. Such consumers
would presumably be in danger of being misled if others were allowed to use the word on their products. Several forms of survey
inquiries could be used. For example, consumers could be asked,
"If you were offered a xerox machine, what would you expect to
get?" Responses including a reference to the Xerox Corporation
would be evidence that the word has source-designating significance. If a respondent does not mention anything relating to
source, a follow-up question would be asked, for example, "Would
you expect it to be made by one particular company?" An affirmative response to this question would indicate that the respondent
considers "Xerox" as a brand-denoting mark that indicates consistent quality, even if it does not associate the mark with the Xerox
Corporation.
Finally, if Xerox makes the required showings, the court
would have to weigh the likelihood that Toshiba would be prevented from competing with Xerox if it were unable to call its
copiers "xerox machines" against the likelihood that if Toshiba
were permitted to do this, consumers who wanted to buy copiers
made by Xerox might be inadvertently led to buy Toshiba copiers.
If, for example, 90% of the consumers surveyed knew no other
word than "xerox" to denote a copier and only 10% were aware
that all "Xerox" products came from a single source, the competitive benefit of permitting Toshiba and other producers of copiers
to use "xerox" as a generic name for their products would outweigh
the likelihood of consumer confusion. Conversely, if 80% of the
consumers surveyed knew other names that could be used to denote a copying machine and 50% were aware that all products denominated "Xerox" came from a single company, then Xerox's
competitors would have no great need to use the word "xerox" to
describe their photocopiers, and considerable consumer confusion
would be likely to result if the mark was held to have become generic. In such a case, the trademark should be upheld.
CONCLUSION

The task of courts deciding genericness cases is to resolve disputes over the use of words in a manner that takes account of the
interests of competing businesses and the consuming public. Because it rests upon an antiquated conception of how trademarks
function in modern markets, the primary significance test cannot
adequately assess the merits of most trademarks in use today.
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Therefore, use of the primary significance test leads to results
under the Lanham Act that Congress did not intend, and courts
should abandon it in favor of an effect-on-competition test. Such a
test would permit courts to balance the competing interests of the
parties and the public with direct reference to the pro-competitive
purpose of trademark law and would better implement the express
intent of Congress that the Lanham Act be construed so as to conform to modern business practices.
John F. Coverdale

